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IMPROVING LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR
HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL
HENRY WIEHOFEN*
Proffe.-sor, 7ni ersity of Neiw Mexico, School of fmw

It is a very good and very hopeful thing that a meeting such
as this should be taking place-a meeting attended by the officers
and committee chairmen of the legal and medical professional organizations, as well as members of the legislature and civic leaders
interested in medical-legal problems. I am very flattered to be
permitted to participate.
This kind of meeting is so very important because doctors and
lawyers usually find it difficult to get together, not only literally
around a luncheon table, but also in their thinking about problems
they are forced to share. Their training and methodology differs
so much that they have difficulty in understanding each other's
viewpoints . . . and also that of other groups, social workers and
volunteers.
The lawyer is likely to regard the doctor as a man who knows
a lot about the human organism, but who is sadly unaware of the
complexities of social organization and who therefore is likely to
be naively impatient with the red tape and the delays that legal
and political action involves. The doctor is inclined to think of
the lawyer as too much absorbed in petty formalities and technicalities. Because the doctor has probably never had pointed out to
him the distinction between an advocate's function and a scientific
investigator's, he is likely to regard the lawyer's willingness to
take almost any kind of case as somewhat venal. That kind of
eyebrow raising is reciprocated by lawyers who have observed too
many medical experts displaying on the witness stand a conscious
or unconscious partisanship unbecoming representatives of the
scientific tradition. These lawyers may not stop to reflect that it
is the established legal procedure that forces expert testimony into
a partisan mold.
This lack of rapport is at least as apparent in the particular
medical-legal field I want to talk about today as in any other. The
subject I should like to discuss is the procedure by which persons
who are mentally ill are admitted to a mental hospital. The fundamental problem here is how to eliminate needless legalistic formality and at the same time maintain adequate legal safeguards
against error and abuse.
The impulse of the lawyer is to emphasize the need for adequate procedure to make sure that sane persons will not be "railroaded" into institutions. They therefore stress the importance of
a fair trial, with adequate personal notice, and a chance to be heard
*An ad(ress before the Colorado Mental Health Association, November 20,
193.
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and to confront the witnesses against one, before being deprived
of one's liberty. Medical men, on the other hand, are likely to
emphasize the harmful results of too much legal formality. They
advocate informal procedure designed to minimize the psychic
traumatization that a judicial trial frequently entails. They want
to eliminate the use of archaic legal phraseology carrying connotations of criminal prosecution and guilt, and set up methods that
encourage voluntary hospitalization and maximum patient participation. They urge that the patient should be recognized to have
not only legal rights, but also what we might call medical rights.
For example, the right to private confidences and sympathetic
handling. They condemn as a violation of this concept of "medical
due process" the public exposure by courts of a psychotic individual's behavior and his confidential communications, and the
public disclosure of the diagnosis and prognosis in the presence of
the patient.
The impatience of medical men with unduly formalized commitment procedures is understandable. But it's worth remembering that these procedures represent the application of principles
of fairness and justice in dealing with human rights that have
been established by generations who saw and suffered the effects
of more summary methods. It is a precious heritage that enables
us to insist that a man be served with notice of the pendency of
any legal action in which his rights may be affected, and that he
have opportunity to be present, to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, and to introduce any testimony he may
have in his own defense, instead of having his rights decided in
a secret star chamber proceeding and his life or liberty taken a
lettre de cachet calling for his confinement or liquidation without
notice or hearing. The terms "star chamber" and "lettre de cachet"
don't describe imaginary evils dreamed up by overcautious lawyers,
but real practices rampant not so many hundreds of years ago and
hardly exceeding practices current in various parts of the world
in our own time.
On the other hand, it is necessary for lawyers to recognize
that commitment to a mental institution involves peculiar considerations not present- in ordinary legal cases. A sane person can
usually be left to decide for himself whether he needs hospital
care for his physical ills. But a mentally ill person may not realize
that he is ill; more often than not, he will rationalize all his symptoms and explain the urgings of his family and physician as evidence of a gigantic plot against him. For the same reason that he
is incapable of reaching a decision to be hospitalized voluntarily,
legal safeguards such as notice and hearing may do him no good,
and he may only be harmed by them. The problem is to devise
procedures that will protect the sane without needlessly subjecting
the sick to heartless and harmful mental torture.
Present practices in many states are not only heartless and
harmful, but cumbersome and expensive as well, without having
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any demonstrable justification as safeguards against arbitrariness
or error.
You are interested specifically in the Colorado procedures.
It is, I feel, somewhat presumptuous for me to come here to tell
you about your law. But I think you prefer me to talk about Colorado law specifically, rather than to stick to safe generalities.
Perhaps you will let me talk as a member of the family. After all,
I lived in Colorado for nine years, teaching at the University of
Colorado, School of Law in Boulder. And I never had any intentions of leaving. In the fall of 1941, I left the state on what was
distinctly understood to be merely a one-year leave of absence, to
do some government work in Washington. I was prevented from
returning by the Japanese Government. It took me seven years
to get out of Washington and back to this part of the country. So
I hope I may be allowed to speak, if not as a Coloradoan, at least
as one whose Colorado citizenship was a war casualty.
Shortly before the war, while still at the University of Colorado, I wrote an article for the Rocky Mountain Law Review,
which that school publishes, entitled, "Commitment of Mental
Patients-Proposals to Eliminate Some Unhappy Features of Our
Legal Procedure." Not a very good title, but the article wasn't
as bad. In that article, I said the Colorado procedure was "cumbersome, expensive and heartless." I recently checked on the
statute to see to what extent it had been improved in the intervening years. I'm afraid that what I said then still holds true.
Colorado still retains the device of a county "lunacy commision" to determine whether a person should be ordered hospitalized.
There are only perhaps two or three other states still using this
device, e.g., Wyoming and Georgia.
I need hardly point out to you the quaint and utter obsoleteness of the word "lunacy" which the statute still retains. The word
harks back to the medieval belief that phases of the moon influenced diseases of the brain. Distempered persons were supposedly
"at the height of their distemper" in the full and change of the
moon, especially about the equinoxes and summer solstice; between
times, they ordinarily had "lucid intervals." Other states have
long ago discarded not only this word, but also other words having
criminal or other unfortunate connotations, like "complaint" "apprehension" and "commitment."
At the time the Colorado law was first adopted, that was the
accepted language for the purpose. The Colorado law-makers
weren't trying to stigmatize the unfortunate victim of mental disorder. But today, what effect do you think it has to describe the
proceeding as an "adjudication of lunacy," and the person as an
"adjudged lunatic?" Words are important. People who wouldn't
have any objection to being sent or having their relatives sent to
a mental hospital, are repulsed and even horrified at the idea of
being "adjudged a lunatic." Using this kind of terminology is a
wholly gratuitous outrage, which only leads people to shun as an
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unholy curse the healing and care that the State of Colorado offers
in its excellent hospitals.
When a lunacy complaint is filed, the Colorado statute provides it must be served on the person. I don't know whether some
of your back counties still entitle this document "Complaint in
Lunacy" in big black letters, but I know they used to. I need hardly
point out that if a person is somewhat unstable mentally, his condition is not going to be helped by being handed such a paper-by
a sheriff. In California, New York and a half dozen other states,
if the court, upon certificate of a physician or otherwise concludes
that service of notice on the patient would be harmful to him, the
judge can order it served on a next friend or relative, other than
the one who signed the application.
The sheriff, when he serves the complaint, must promptly "apprehend" the person and take him into custody. This provision
dates from older times, when the only persons recognized as needing confinement were those who were violent and dangerous. But
most of the people ordered into mental hospitals today are not raving maniacs who must promptly be handed over to the sheriff.
Why not eliminate the arrest except for those cases that actually
are violent or otherwise dangerous.
Some time after the arrest, the person is interviewed by the
physicians making up the lunacy commission and at a still later
time an informal hearing is held. At this hearing, two quite distinct questions are tried. The first is the person's mental condition.
The complaiJning witness and others are required to testify as to
the person's .mentalcondition. The patient must be present at the
first session and has the right to be present at all. Needless to say,
it is likely to be a distressing and even tragic ordeal to the patient
and to his family for them to have to testify to his condition and
all the irrational acts. A good many of the mentally ill, especially
the paranoid types, already feel that people dislike them and are
persecuting them and for good reason. Requiring them to sit in a
courtroom and listen to their trusted physician and nearest and
dearest relatives testify to the facts regarding their mental condition is likely to cofifirm their worst suspicions. The result may be
dangerous to the dthers as well as harmful to the patient's self
preservation. Other states, including our neighboring Utah, have
long since given the judge discretion to waive the requirement of
the patient's presence where it might be detrimental.
The other question that this commission of doctors must decide
is whether he owns any property, so that he is able to pay for the
cost of his care in the hospital himself. Why this should be put to
a commission of doctors I can't see. The sensible way would be to
have that question determined administratively, rather than by a
trial. That would not only be simpler, but you would be much more
likely to get the truth, and the money, by hiring a couple of investigators than using doctors sitting in a hearing. Most other states
do it that way; why not Colorado.
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If the commission reports that the person is insane or distracted so as to endanger his own or another's life or property, it
is the duty of the court to order commitment. But if the patient
or someone in his behalf is dissatisfied with the commitment order,
he may demand a trial before a jury of six.
Most states have abolished jury trials in commitment cases.
The objections to jury trials are several:
1. The traumatic effects on the patient are serious. As Dr.
Manfred Cuttmacher and I said in a recent book, "There is hardly
a more powerful device conceivable for convincing a person with
delusions of persecution that his suspicions are true than subjecting
him to a jury trial."
2. The reluctance of relatives to expose before a jury what
they regard as the shame and disgrace of having "insanity" in the
family, and to testify against their own kin in such a public performance, cause many relatives to postpone taking this step until
the condition has become hopeless. The result is that the state has
to support perhaps for a long lifetime, someone whom it could have
cured in a year or two, if treatment had started early enough.
People have spent their life savings to get private care rather than
suffer the ordeal and the publicity of court commitment proceedings.
3. A jury of laymen is obviously not well qualified to pass on
a question calling for a highly specialized medical diagnosis. There
is even statistical evidence that juries make more mistakes than
judges or medical commissions. And I don't suppose there is any
reason to be surprised at that. The person who is most likely to
demand a jury is the mentally ill person with a persecution complex. And if he is articulate and quick-witted, as such types very
frequently are, he may convince a jury that his story of a nefarious
plot to railroad him is true. Persons unskilled in psychiatry are
likely not to realize that even a seriously mentally disordered person
does not exhibit his symptoms all the time. Especially on such a
special occasion as a trial, he may be able to cover up temporarily
his abnormal ideas and attitudes, and appear quite normal. Only
the phychiatrist who has observed him over a period of time may
realize that he has all the characteristic symptoms of a major
phychosis.
WHETHER INSTITUTION IS REQUIRED TO ADMIT

Miss Woodhouse has called my attention to the recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court holding that the superintendant of the State Home at Ridge is not required to accept
mental defectives ordered committed to that institution by the
court, if there is no room in the institution.
This is a problem that plagues many states. The institution
is overcrowded; should the courts be allowed to continue to commit
persons without regard to whether there is room available. Or,
on the other hand, should persons who the courts have found need
institutional care be denied it. In New Mexico, our legislature

DICTA

Mar., 1954

has given two different answers. The state hospital is required
to accept all commitments; the state school for mental defectives
is not. The result is bad in each case. The hospital is overcrowded,
and the staff has no power to object, no matter how many new
cases are sent to it. On the other hand, the state school has a filing
cabinet full of applications which it is unable to accept because it
is full.
The right answer of course is to build more hospitals. But
there are always competing uses for the state's money, and the
mental patients are not the most powerful lobby working on the
legislature. So in the meantime we have to meet the problems that
the shortage causes.
In Massachusetts, my friend Dr. Winfred Overholser, superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, tells me, they
have an informal arrangement by which the judges do not commit
to the state school unless the school can assure the judge that the
child can be received, Something of the sort also operates in the
District of Columbia. While the situation is deplorable for children
who cannot be sent to the state school because there is no room,
yet the courts could jam the place hopelessly if the institution did
not have power to prevent it.
COMMITMENT OF NON-RESIDENTS

I have more doubt about the soundness of another Colorado
decision, Kendall v. People, in which the court held that the courts
in Denver County did not have jurisdiction to commit a person
whose residence is in another county-even if the court of the
home county consented. The problem arises this way: A person
whose home is on the western slope, let us say, is suspected by his
family or others of being mentally disordered. They obtain his
admission to the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital, or to the Veterans
Hospital, or some other institution or clinic in Denver, for examination and observation. It appears that he should be hospitalized.
It seems an outrageous imposition on the patient to have to transport him all the way back home, have a commitment hearing in his
home county, and then bring him back to Denver or to Pueblo.
To avoid this useless expense and trouble, it has apparently
been the practice in some cases to obtain the consent of the court
in the home county to permit the Denver court to conduct the commitment proceedings. This practice now has apparently been held
invalid by the State Supreme Court.
This seems to me unfortunate. It is true, as the Supreme Court
says, that loose procedure may lead to abuse. There was a case
some years ago that illustrates this. It was not a Colorado case.
It involved a Wichita, Kansas, dentist. His brother, Bernard, who
lived in Missouri, decided that the dentist was losing his mind.
He arranged for them to drive to Indiana together. While driving
through his home town in Howard County, Missouri, Bernard asked
his brother to stop at the courthouse, where he had some business
to attend to. The dentist- waited downstairs, while Bernard trans-
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acted his business, which turned out to be the filing of an information alleging that the dentist was insane. A notice was prepared
on the spot by the obliging judge, setting a date for a hearing. A
deputy sheriff thereupon arrested the dentist as he stood on the
street waiting for his brother to return. He was taken to jail anl
from there to a hospital. Although the notice has stated that he
was entitled to be present at the hearing, and to be represented by
counsel, the asylum to which he had been sent had a rule that
inmates could not be released for that purpose, and so he was found
insane without his being present. His brother Bernard was appointed guardian. Bernard then proceeded to get court permission
to sell and otherwise control the dentist's property. It took some
time for news of the dentist's incarceration to reach friends, who
retained counsel for him. It took a habeas corpus proceeding in
the federal court to obtain his release. The federal court held that
his commitment and confinement were all illegal, because he was
not even a resident of Howard County, or even of the state of
Missouri.
The Colorado court is therefore quite right in being careful
about permitting people to be ordered committed elsewhere than
in their home county. Nevertheless, I think proper safeguards
could be devised and insisted on, and the practice permitted with
such safeguards. The safeguards should be:
1. That the court of the county of residence give its consent;
2. That the court agrees that the county of residence will bear
the expense; and
3. That investigation of whether the person owns property in
the county of residence has been determined or will be determined by the court of that county.
I even venture to suggest that the Kendall case may not foreclose this result. That case may perhaps be distinguished, and the
court induced to limit it to its own facts. Those facts present several other reasons for the holding. Thus, the complaint alleged
that the patient was "a resident of the county jail in the City and
County of Denver." The commission report was confusing in that
it answered all three of the statutory questions regarding mental
conditions in the affirmative. The commission and the committing
court had also ignored the fact that the patient owned property in
Montezuma County, and reported that "said person has no estate
out of which his care and maintenance can be made." If in a new
case these objections or errors are not present, and a strong argument is presented to the court, pointing up that it is both humane
and economical to permit the practice-with adequate safeguardsthere is a chance that the court might be willing to re-examine
the question. It is quite clear in my own mind that the statute
itself does not forbid the practice. On the contrary, it clearly indicates that the court of a county may have jurisdiction to commit
at person who is "found" in that county, even though he may be
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a non-resident of the county, and even though he may be a nonresident of the state.
I shall not presume to t2ll you what you ought to do about
improving the Colorado law. Instead, let me tell you what we did
in New Mexico.
Our law was definitely worse than Colorado's. It provided
for a "charge" being filed against a person alleged to be insane.
A peace officer was thereupon ordered to "apprehend and detain"
him under a "warrant of apprehension." The "defendant," as he
was called, was thereupon "arraigned" before a judge, who was
required to "inform him that he is charged with being insane" and
to "inform him of his rights to make a defense to such charge."
He wasn't required to plead guilty or not guilty, but the connotation of a criminal accusation was certainly there.
We succeeded in having that law repealed this year, and a
model law substituted. And by we, I mean a group just like this.
namely, the New Mexico Conference on Social Welfare and the
Mental Hygiene Society in Albuquerque. Actually, the bill was
pushed through by a handful of individuals.
Remember that this isn't a controversial issue, in the political
sense. It doesn't require any new tax or any appropriation. There
is no pressure group whom it would hurt and who will oppose it.
You can get it considered strictly on the merits. We found that it
is not too difficult to convince a few key members of the House
and Senate committees that the bill will improve the existing procedure. I understand you tried to amend your statute.
Nor do you have to start from scratch to draft a wholly new
act. A committee of psychiatrists and lawyers working under the
auspicesxbf the National Institute of Mental Health has drafted a
model act for the hospitalization of the mentally ill. This draft
represents the most modern thinking on the subject, translated
into concrete legal procedures. You can simply have the legislature adopt this model, with such slight adaptations as local law
might require. That is what we did in New Mexico.
This act permits hospitalization in the great majority of cases
without judicial proceedings. A person can be admitted upon application by someone on his behalf, plus certification by two "designated examiners" (that is, physicians registered as specially qualified under standards to be set up by a state agency such as a board
of health).
A judicial hearing is required only for compulsory hospitalization of someone who refuses to go peacefully where there is no
emergency and no danger of injury. The act also provides for
emergency admission, and for voluntary hospitalization.
It also has a novel "bill of rights" for patients, including not
only general rights such as the right to "humane care and treatment," and to the highest standards of medical care possible with
the facilities and personnel available, but also the right to communicate by sealed mail, to receive visitors and to exercise civil
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rights, including the right to dispose of property, make contracts
and to vote, except insofar as one may have been declared incompetent to exercise such rights. Mechanical restraints are not to be
applied except where found necessary by the head of the institution,
and every use of such a restraint and the reasons therefor is to be
part of the clinical record of the patient.
This model act offers an immense improvement over older
legal procedures. It is ingeniously devised to allow voluintary or
involuntary hospitalization without needless red tape, and yet to
provide the fullest kind of judicial hearing in any case where the
person wants it.
I have mentioned the importance of early treatment. Even
more important is prevention. One of the most useful functions an
organization like this can serve is educating the public in what we
ought to know about mental illness, its causes and how to prevent
or cure it. Reforming the commitment law is a specific objective,
which it is to be hoped won't take you too long and which when
achieved, won't have to be done again for a while.
But educating parents, teachers and others in what we should
know about human personality is an unending job. Especially
3 truths, it is important to get over:
1. Mental disorder is caused.
2. The causes of most mental disorders start much farther
back in early childhood, in infancy, than we formerly
realized.
Wrongdoers-Can usually find were symptoms a long time.
Gluecks' 500-Over half had manifested significant signs
of anti-social behavior before they were 8. 9/10 before 11.
Causes-Insecurity, or uncertainty in love and affection.
Overstrict, domineering parents-or overindulgent.
3. Most can be cured if caught early enough, as T. B. and
cancer. That's why it is important to have procedure to
encourage that. Save these long expensive custodial commitments. Teach parents and teachers to spot the overaggresive or the too passive child.
Of course, to provide the individual with all the favorable
factors for healthy personality development, to allow him to realize
and express his own personality, we'd pretty much have to rebuild
the world. And create a world that satisfies the individual's need
for economic security, for affection, for status, prestige and group
identification-a world stable enough to afford a feeling of security
and yet flexible enough to adapt itself to change.
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HOW NOT TO TRY A LAW SUIT
JUDGE 0. Z. IDE, of the Detroit Bar

Judge Ide is an experienced trial judge of Detroit, Michigan
and has formulated the following thirteen hints on what not to do
in the trial of a law suit. These are taken from an article written
by Judge Ide which was published in The Detroit Lawyer, Journal
of the Detroit Bar Association, for April, 1953.
1. Don't come into Court without looking your best. A clean
shave, well groomed hair and a well pressed suit will give you a
sense of well-being which will make for poise and confidence.
2. Don't have a "foggy" head when you try a law-suit. Get
a good rest the night before. It will pay off.
3. Don't be late in arriving at Court. If delay is unavoidable
send word to the Court explaining your reasons, and upon your
arrival make your apologies in the presence of the jury.
4. Don't be discourteous to Court or counsel. Remember you
are an officer of the Court and should attempt to maintain the
dignity of the Court and assist in promoting an orderly trial.
5. Don't enter the judge's chambers without invitation or
asking permission. His time during short recesses of Court is
usually committed to important matters incidental to Court work.
6. Don't ask trick questions on your voir dire examination of
prospective jurors. Remember they are laymen and will possibly
resent any embarrassment which you might cause them.
7. Don't sit or sprawl when examining witnesses, making
objections or addressing the Court. Always rise. You look better,
think better, and give some indication that you are a gentleman.
8. Don't brow-beat witnesses on cross-examination. The jurors don't like it.
9. Don't over-try your case. Too much corroboration, especially of unimportant points, often indicates that you are weak
on the main issues, or think you are.
10. Don't waste time on collateral issues when you have a good
case. It diverts the jury's mind from the principal questions involved.
11. Don't attempt to read law to the jury or to explain to them
the difference between "reasonable doubt" and "preponderance of
the evidence." It sounds learned but is ordinarily a waste of time
and usually leaves them in doubt as to what is a reasonable doubt.
12. Don't wait until the arguments are in before submitting
special requests to charge. The judge has usually prepared his
charge by that time and must necessarily interrupt proceedings to
consider your requests if he is to give them at all.
13. Don't repeat the witnesses' answers to your questions,
especially if the answers are unfavorable to your cause, unless you
are in league with the Court Reporter and aspire to build up a topheavy transcript; and remember that "repetition is the life of
force."
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OIL AND GAS TAXATION
FRANK H. SHAFROTH, of the Denver Bar

It should be noted that this article on oil and gas taxation does
not attempt to cover this field of law in any detailed manner, but
is rather an attempt to set forth certain practical and general
problems commonly met.
The first transaction which usually occurs in the search for
oil and gas is the grant by the owner of the minerals, who is
usually the owner of the surface land also, of an oil and gas, lease
to a second party. Generally, this lease calls for a bonus, which is
the consideration for the lease, and an annual delay rental in the
event drilling has not occurred during the year. The tax consequences of this transaction are as follows:
1. The lessor treats the bonus paid to him as an advance
royalty and reports the full amount as income, deducting,
however, 271/2 percentage depletion.
2. The lessor treats the delay rentals as income. This income is not subject to depletion.
3. The lessee treats the bonus paid as cost of acquisition
of the lease and capitalizes it. Two recent cases have held
that in non-competitive federal leases the first year rental
(which is very similar to bonus) can be expensed.1
4. The lessee can either expense the delay rentals or he
can capitalize them under the special provisions of Internal
Revenue Code Sec. 24 (a) (7).
The lessee now has a choice of attempting to explore for oil
and gas himself or of assigning his lease to a third party. In the
event that he decides on the latter course he has the choice of
several different methods.
1. He can assign his lease to a third party for cash only.
If he elects to follow this method he can treat the transaction
as a sale and report as a capital gain the difference between
his acquisition cost and the bonus which he received; unless
he is a dealer engaged in oil aud gas leases.
2. A second method of disposing of the leasehold would
be to assign the same to a third party for a bonus and an
overriding royalty. An overriding royalty has been defined
as being a royalty which is retained by the lessee when he
assigns the lease to another. In this case the assignor of the
lease must treat the bonus received as ordinary income subject to percentage depletion, and his overriding royalty will
be capitalized at the same cost as the original acquisition cost
of his lease. The reason for this tax treatment is that since
the assignor has reserved an economic interest in the oil and
gas lease which lasts for the duration of the lease he is considered as having given only a sublease to the third party.
Hagwood v. United States, 53-5 Fed. Tax Rep. 9642.
Dougan v. United States, 53-5 Fed. Tax Rep.
9568.
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3. A third alternative is for the assignor to assign the
lease for a bonus and an oil payment. An oil or gas payment
has been defined as being the right to receive a stated number of barrels of oil or a stated number of MCF of gas or a
stated sum of money from a specified percentage of oil or
gas production only, or the proceeds therefrom.2 This type
of transaction will be considered a sale and a capital gain on
the bonus can be taken by the assignor if he is not engaged
in the business.
4. The last alternative is for the assignor to assign in
consideration of a bonus and a net profit interest. The net
profit arrangement has been defined as being a contract which
provides that the owner thereof shall receive a stated percentage of the net profits from the operation of the oil and gas
property to which the contract refers. The law is not clear
as to how this transaction is treated tax-wise, but the Bureau
of Internal Revenue takes the position that it is a sublease
rather than a sale. In light of the Kirby Petroleum Co. case,
326 U. S. 599, and the Burton-Sutton Oil Company case, 328
U. S. 25, the Bureau's position is justified.
Now let us suppose that the assignee of the lease desires to
have a well drilled on the property. In this event he has the, following choices:
1. He can drill it himself or finance its drilling with his
own money, in which case he will be entitled to expense his
intangible drilling costs. Intangible drilling costs represent
expenditures which have no salvage value and roughly constitute 60% or more of the total cost of a producing well, or
almost 100% of the cost of a dry hole. It should be pointed
out, however, that if the taxpayer desires to expense his intangibles he must make his election by a clear statement in
the return for the first taxable year in which such costs are
incurred,3 and this election is binding for all subsequent years.
In the event that the taxpayer elects to capitalize the intangibles he has a further choice of expensing4 in the event of a dry
hole but again must make said election.
2. The owner of the lease can give an oil payment for
having a well drilled thereon, in which case the driller or
operator cannot expense the costs of drilling the well but
must capitalize these expenses as the cost of his or its oil
payment.- In the event of production the holder of the oil
payment reports the income therefrom as straight income
subject to either cost or percentage depletion. Of course, the
income attributable to the oil payment is not reported as income by the holder of the lease.
1If security other than production is given, a mortgage rather
payment is created. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U. S. 404.
'Reg.
111, Sec. 29.23(m)-16.
4
Ibid.
'Herndon Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 628.

than an oil
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3. The lessee can give a net profit interest in consideration of having a well drilled. From the language of the Kirby
and Burton-Sutton cases, supra, it would appear that this
transaction would be treated in the same way as an oil payment type transaction.
4. The lessee can enter into a carried interest arrangement. A carried interest arrangement occurs where one party
referred to as the "carrying party") agrees to pay for the
drilling and equipping of a well, and the second party (referred to as the "carried party") agrees to repay to the carrying party the proportionate share of the cost advanced, only
from his (the carried party's) share of oil, if, as, and when
produced from the lease. There are two different types of
carried interests, one lasting for the duration of the lease,
and the other for a limited time. The tax treatment in regard
to this transaction is presently in a state of confusion, there
being two different theories of the applicable taxation, which
are as follows:
a. The joint venture theory treats both the carried
and the carrying parties as though they are both owners
of their proportionate interests (and in effect says that
the carried party has merely received a loan from the
carrying party), and under this theory the carrying party
reports only his share of the intangible drilling expenses
as well as income. The carried party reports his share
of the income even though he may not actually receive
any for the reason that it has been used to reimburse
the carrying party. The case of Reynolds v. MeMurray,
60 F. 2d 843, and Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Co.,
162 F. 2d 338, followed this rule, except that neither case
went into the expensing of intangibles. However, these
cases are not conclusive since the carried interests involved in both cases were interests which lasted for the
entire life of the lease.
b. The transaction is treated as though the carrying
party has the entire interest until he has been reimbursed
by the carried party. This theory is set forth in GCM
22730 and has been chiefly responsible for the popularity
of the carried interest arrangement. Tax treatment under
this theory allows the carrying party to expense 100%
of the intangibles. He also must report as income subject
to depletion 100% of the income from said well until he
has been reimbursed by the carried party at which time
he will only report his proportion as well as deducting
his proportion of the expense. Likewise, after the payout or reimbursement, the carried party must report all
income attributable to his share of the working interest.
5. The joint venture theory is one of the most commonly
used methods of financing the drilling of a well. The owner
transfers undivided working interests to others who pay for
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the drilling and equipping of the well and who are in turn
entitled to expense the intangibles for their proportionate
share. The operator who has put up no money, of course, is
not allowed to take any intangibles. Caution should be exercised under this type of arrangement in order to avoid having
the joint venture treated as a corporation. Specifically, the
contract should provide that each joint venturer is entitled
to his share of oil and gas in kind.
In the event of production, the owner or owners of the working interest can sell the same and take a capital gain on the sale.
There is some intimation, however, in a recent case 6 that a new
property has come into being when production has been obtained
and that therefore the six-month holding period does not commence until the date of production. This appears to be a farfetched theory, but should be studied before selling one's working interest.
Internal Revenue Regulation 111, Sec. 29.105-1 7 contains a
special provision for the selling of a leasehold, and reads as follows:
If the taxpayer by prospecting and locating claims,
or by exploring or discovering undeveloped claims has
demonstrated the principal value of oil or gas property,
which prior to his efforts had a relatively minor value,
the portion of the surtax imposed by Sec. 12, attributable
to a sale of such property or of the taxpayer's interest
therein shall not exceed 30% of the selling price. Shares
of stock in a corporation owning oil or gas property do
not constitute an interest in such property.
Often the sale of a producing leasehold is financed by an oil
payment. One of the primary reasons for this method of financing the sale is the tax saving which isinvolved. In such a transaction the owner may sell to a second party, receiving his capital
gain, and the second party then sells to a third party, taking back
an oil payment. The third party is then in somewhat the same
position as the buyer of a property subject to a mortgage, but,
unlike the buyer of the average property subject to a mortgage,
he does not have to report as income the money paid on the oil
payment. Thus, the tax saving which is involved is apparents
In the event of a dry hole the owner of the lease may report
as a loss his leasehold costs. However, caution must be exercised
as to reporting this loss in the year in which the lease becomes
worthless.
The owner of the minerals may sell them or an undivided
interest therein and treat the same as a capital gain transaction
6Petroleum Exploration v. Commissioner, 193 F. 2d. 59.
753-2 Fed. Tax Rep. 684.

SFor an interesting article on oil payments and valuation thereof, see "Vol-

itation of Oil and Gas Producing Properties for Loan Pitrposes.'' by Lyon F.
Terry and Kenneth E. Hill, Petroleum Department, The Chase National Bank of
the City of New York, February 17, 1953.
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regardless of whether there has been a dry hole or production
has been achieved.
It can readily be seen that a tremendous tax saving can be
made by one desiring to participate in the finding of oil and gas,
but that in order to take the benefit of said savings great care
should be exercised not only in setting up the transaction but also
in drafting the necessary instruments.

COURT ROOM DECORUM*
JOSEPH H. HINSHAW, of the Chicago Bar

A strong desire for democracy has caused most Americans to
resent a severe formality in any procedure. The reaction has been
to deteriorate decorum in many of our courts, especially the lower
courts; and to cause many laymen to lower their respect for both
judges and lawyers. Even the "dusty foot" courts of England
might not compare so unfavorably with some of our police courts.
It is difficult for a judge to change the conduct of the lawyers.
because he also prefers to be democratic. For this reason many of
our judges have refused to wear robes. The lawyers are his friends,
and he is careful not to embarrass them by reprimands before their
clients.
Every lawyer should remember that in deed and in fact he
is an officer of the 'ourt, and that he has a direct duty to help look
after it. He can do more even than the judge to maintain in the
court room a simple, yet respectful, dignity. To this end may we
not consider a few concrete suggestions?
When the judge enters the room, all should rise and wait to
be invited to be seated. Except in the course of a trial, if a judge
speaks to an attorney while the attorney is sitting the attorney
should rise to answer the court. The proper way to address the
court in the first instance is "May the Court please," not "If the
Court please," and these words, of course, should be spoken while
the lawyer is on his feet.
The judge will try not to tolerate personalities, and to aid in
this effort to be abstract and impersonal, the lawyer should address
the court in the third person, as "The Court will remember the
testimony," not "You will remember, etc.," or "On the 5th instant
the Court entered an order," not "On the 5th instant you entered
an order." When the judge is on the bench, he should never be
addressed as "You."
When the judge invites the lawyers into chambers, the lawyers
should stand back and wait for the judge to enter first; and on returning to the court room, the judge should enter the court room
first. In chambers, judge and counsel may be as informal as they
*Reprinted from the Journal of the American Judicature Society, Vol. 37,
No. 2, August, 1953.
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please, when laymen are not present. Usually they are all good
friends anyway. In chambers a good story often helps negotiations, but if levity becomes loud enough to carry to the court room
outside, clients are likely to conclude that their precious rights are
being disposed of in a flippant manner.
To the public, the judge is the court, and whether the lawyer
may like the judge or not, he is the one who administers what
justice there is in the community. The layman is not likely to
respect a judge to whom the lawyers show no respect. Whatever,
in relation to the public, will affect the judge adversely will also
affect the lawyer adversely.
When the judge on the bench begins to speak while a lawyer
is speaking, the lawyer should stop immediately, even in the
middle of a sentence. Judges, of course, must be convinced. Sometimes a judge must even be induced to change in his mind. A
lawyer may argue to a judge earnestly and pointedly and with
all the force at his command, but to do this it is not necessary
to argue in a loud voice nor in an angry tone. Most judges can
hear quite well. Argument to a court usually concerns a point of
law, and the more effective style is to approach the matter in an
abstract way. When the court is listening to argument, he is entitled to the lawyer's whole attention, and the court should not be
annoyed by the lawyer turning away from the court and toward
the rear of the room, as if the lawyer sought an audience there.
Such conduct may impress the layman, but it certainly will not
impress the judge who must decide the matter.
A lawyer should not, while wearing an overcoat and rubbers,
nor with his hat in his hand, address a court. Take off the rubbers
and hang the coat on the rack. Don't throw the coat over a chair
at the trial table, nor on the trial table. If no rack is provided,
it is the duty of the bar to see that one is provided. The lawyer
should not enter the court room, then take off his hat. He should
take off his hat and then enter. He should see to it that his client
does likewise, and not wait until the bailiff is obliged to force the
issue. He should tell his clients that they cannot read a newspaper
nor do knitting nor attend a howling baby while the judge is trying
to hold court. The client should not be brought inside the rail unless
he has definite business there.
A few whispers in the court room while court is in session are
often necessary to a lawyer, but an extended conversation should
be carried on outside. Unnecessary conversation with the minute
clerk can be very annoying to the court, and may distract that
court's attention when a fellow lawyer is trying hard to hold it.
If the bailiff raps for order, the lawyer should not try to show
that he has a "drag" by ignoring the order or suggestion of the
bailiff, or just because he thinks the judge is too polite to resort
to a reprimand. It is a part of the lawyer's duty to help the court
maintain order. If the bailiff is offensively officious, as is somtimes
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the case, take the matter up with the judge in the chambers during a recess.
The attorney who carries inside the rail a cigar or cigarette
turned to the palm of his hand, is like the little boy who holds the
apple behind him. He is hiding it from no one except himself. If
he puts it on the window sill, it is no ornament and will probably
mar the wood before he thinks of it again. He probably would not
want his friends to think that he could not afford to buy another
cigar.
In the southern jurisdictions, it is often very hot in the court
rooms in the summer time. In spite of the heat, the attorney should
wear some kind of coat if the judge wears one. The bench is higher
and hotter than the trial table. Coats should not be left off without
the permission of the court.
When before the court, the attorney should not drape himself
over the bar not rest on it with one elbow. If he could see himself
from the rear, he would stand on his two feet and act like a lawyer,
and not like a barfly.
Brief cases with lugs should not be placed on the trial table.
but on the floor, where the lawyer's feet also should rest. The trial
table belongs for the moment, to the lawyers who are before the
court, and other lawyers should respect their rights.
Lawyers should make a real effort not to interrupt each other
in argument. Sometimes an opponent is so vociferous that there
is no opportunity to reply, or he deliberately intends, once he has
the floor, to take up all the time of the court so that there can be
no reply. The temptation is to break into such unnecessarily prolonged discourse, to talk louder than the opponent does, and thereby
obtain the attention of the court. This, of course, brings on a
bedlam which is no credit to the bar or the bench. When faced with
such a circumstance, a decent lawyer is justified in interrupting
only long enough to ask the court to assure him that he will have a
turn and an equal opportunity to be heard. Usually this is sufficient and much more effective.
In metropolitan communities, there are so many court rooms
that it is difficult for the bar to take effective part in their care.
In many communities, however, we find really only one or two
court rooms. If such a court room is ugly or dirty, and can be
made respectable and cheerful by a reasonable expenditure, it is
the duty of the bar to force the custodian to do his duty, or otherwise see to it that the room is presentable even if the bar members
have to bear some of the expenses. It is their second home, and
they should see that it is a respectable one.
These may appear to be small matters, but together they
create the mental picture which is carried in the mind of the
public, and they are more important to the standing of the lawyer
in the community than many of us realize.
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TEXAS AND
COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION STATUTES
E. N. JUHANt
INTRODUCTION

Oil and gas are natural resources which cannot be replaced,
and the power of the state to impose reasonable regulations to
prevent waste in the production, handling, and marketing thereof,
is undoubted.'
Oil does not produce itself. Crude oil, as it exists at the surface, possesses no energy with which to expel itself from the pores
of a rock. It is necessary that crude oil be associated with an
energy source before it can be moved into the bottom of a well
and raised to the surface of the earth. The two chief sources of
energy found in most petroleum reservoirs are gas expansion and
2
water encroachment.
One of the main problems of conservation is to apply remedies
or measures to maintain, as far as possible, reservoir energy.
Failure to do so, leaves a greater part of the oil in formation, for
which there is no recoveryA Other ways from which waste may
result are evaporation, seepage, fire, damage to underground formations due to improper methods, premature abandonment of
stripper wells, loss of gas to the air by flaring, and an unwillingness on the part of the companies to trade information. Most of the
Commission's regulations are directed to the prevention of physical
waste, e.g., open pit storage of oil, damage to mineral deposits,
pollution and surface damage, open flows and control of wild wells,
4
gas-oil ratios, and many more.
The main controversy about objectives of regulation concerns
the extent to which proration, i.e., the assignment to each well of
a rate of flow less than its capacity, is attributable to conservation
motives, and the extent to which it is designed to maintain prices.
The title of one of the many books on the subject, aptly puts the
question: "Oil. Stabilization or Conservation?" It seems apparent
that proration has helped to maintain the price of oil.
THE COMMISSIONS AND THEIR STAFFS

The Railroad Commission of Texas was created in 1891 by
constitutional amendment. It is composed of three members with
six-year overlapping terms, at first appointed by the Governor, but
since the Constitutional Amendment of 1894, elected by the people.
tStudent, University of Denver College of Law.
'Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation (Okla.) 51 Fed. 2d 823 (1931).
'Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Oil and Gas Production.
'Some of the oil may be produced by secondary recovery methods.
4The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado. Rules
201-341.
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The chairmanship is rotated in such a way that each commissioner is chairman for the two years immediately preceding
time for re-election. Apart from the chairmanship, there is no
significant division of duties among commissioners.
Control of oil and gas production and pipe lines is handled
through the Oil and Gas Division, for whose activities the Commission spends about seventy per cent of its annual funds. The
division had 265 employees in January, 1943, of whom about half
were stationed in Austin, and about half in the offices of the ten
districts. Most staff positions are filled on a political patronage
basis. Commissioners have frankly declared that appointments
are rationed, one-third to each commissioner.5
In 1927, the Colorado Legislature passed an Act forbidding
the waste or wasteful use of natural gas, creating the Colorado
Gas Conservation Commission. Since that time, the Gas Conservation Commission has endeavored to secure the passage of a
better conservation law.6 After many attempts and frustrations,
and being opposed by a strong oil lobby, the gas Conservation Com-7
mission, in 1951, finally got the present conservation law enacted.
The Act provides for a Commission of five members, four of
whom shall be appointed by the Governor. Those appointed must
have at least five years experience in the production of oil and gas,
and be at least thirty years of age. All members appointed by the
Governor, shall serve for a period of four years without compensation. The fifth member of the Commission is the State Oil Inspector, who is the only paid member of the Commission. 8
The employees of the Commission vary from time to time,
according to the needs of the Commission. The office staff consists
of two or three secretaries, and the field force consists of one to
three engineers. The employees of the Commission are not picked
on a political patronage basis, as is the case in Texas.
INFORMAL PROCESSES

A very large part of the Railroad Commission's business is
handled without hearings of any kind, formal or informal. The
statute, however, provides that no rule, regulation, or order shall
be adopted by the Commission, except after hearing, upon at least
ten days notice. 9 Nevertheless, hearings are dispensed with in
certain situations.
If the question is whether or not a well has been properly
completed and equipped, the way for the Commission to discover
the facts, is to have its agent examine the well, not to hold a hearing. If the question is whether or not a well should be classified
Kenneth Culp Davis and York Y. Willbern, Administrative Control of Oil
Production in Texas (1944) 22 Texas Law Review 152.
6 Warwick M. Downing, Conservation of Oil Resources-Colorado's
Position
Today (1950), Rocky Mountain Law Review, Symposium on Natural Resources
Law.
SColorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951.
'Ibid. See 2.
9Texas Stat. (Vernon, 19.36) art. 6016a.
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marginal, the way to ascertain the well's productive capacity,
for the Commission to accept without question, the statements
the operator, or require the operator to run a production test,
have the Commission's own engineers run a production test.
In a system of administration of this character, decisions by
the Commission and staff, even where discretion is wide, will naturally or normally be made in many instances without any proceeding
that can be characterized a hearing.
Substantive rights hinge, in large measure, on informal investigations and inspections of many kinds. The Commission's
engineers in the field may be lenient or strict, fair or unfair. Before
issuance of formal rules, the Commission holds hearings; yet the
operator may be as vitally affected by statements of Commission
policy, in letters to supervisors, concerning the standards they are
to require in the supervision of, say, casing and plugging practices.
From the practical standpoint of getting the Commission's
work done as efficiently as is consistent with private interests, it
is difficult to see how
hearings on such matters of administrative
10
detail could be held.
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, provides
that no rule, regulation, or order, or amendment shall be made by
the Commission without a hearing, upon at least ten days notice."
The Colorado Statute wording is very similar to the Texas Statute.
The Conservation Commission has, up to now, strictly adhered to the statutory requirement of a hearing, but it is submitted
that if Colorado becomes a major oil producing state, such as
Texas, the procedure may become burdensome.
THE REQUIREMENT OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

Whether or not a hearing should precede particular administrative action, depends upon statutory and constitutional requirements.
Both the Texas statute and the Colorado statute provide that
"no rule, regulation, or order shall be made by the Commission
without a hearing", with certain exceptions.
Literal interpretation of the term "order", in these statutes,
would be intolerable if not absurd. The statute, thus construed,
would require hearings to precede each "order", the implication
being that no hearing is required when the Commission takes no
action. This requires both too little and too much, for it is probably
the opposite of what good sense would require with respect to
most of the Commission's activities having to do with permits,
certificates of compliance, exemptions and exceptions to rules.
To construe the statutes literally would render them capricious
and unreasonable and that is not what the legislatures could have
intended. So long as the statutes stand, the term "order" should
"0Kenneth Culp Davis and York Y. Willbern, Administrative Control of Oil
Production in Texas (1944) 22 Texas Law Review 152.
1 Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, See. 8 (b).
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be broadly interpreted to cover the adjudication of all disputes of
fact where the hearing process is the appropriate method for settling the controversy, and the term "order" should be narrowly
construed so as to exclude action which may appropriately rest
upon inspections or examinations or tests, or upon conversations
or correspondence.
Of course, whatever the statute may provide, a party with a
substantial property interest at stake is constitutionally entitled to
hearing on any disputed questions of fact concerning him or his
property which may be appropriately resolved
by the process of
12
hearing testimony or taking other evidence.
The Texas statute requiring hearings, expressly provides two
exceptions :13 In emergency situations the Commission can issue
emergency rules, regulations, and orders, but the rule or order
shall remain in effect no longer than fifteen (15) days from its
effective date. The provision for emergency rules is desirable and
wise and has occasionally been invoked by the Commission.
The other exception provides that the Commission may, without prior notice, revoke any rule, regulation, or order promulgated
by it and it may amend any regulation, rule or order, provided the
subject matter of the amendment was considered at the original
hearing. The seeming authorization for revocation or amendment
of rules or orders without hearing is ill-considered and badly
drafted. Revocation of a rule or order may affect private rights
just as seriously as promulgation of a rule or order. For example,
a certificate of compliance permits the production of oil, and the
issuance of a certificate is in the nature of an order. The Commission is specifically empowered to cancel such a certificate. If the
issuance is an order, the cancellation is a revocation of an order.
But if facts concerning the legality of an operator's acts are disputed, it would be unfair to cancel his certificate without opportunity for hearing. The provision for amendment of rules or orders
without a hearing seems just as strange. Because of changing
conditions, even though the subject matter of the amendment was
considered in the first hearing, a hearing should be had before the
amendment becomes effective.
Since most matters concerning rules are considered in some
degree at the original hearing, the statute seems to confer a great
deal of liberty to the Commission to change rules without a hearing.
In practice, however, the Commission usually holds hearings before making significant changes, even when the subject has been
previously considered.
The corresponding provision in the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act has been more intelligently drafted. 14 It provides
that the Commission can issue emergency orders without notice
"Kenneth Culp Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the
Administrative Process (1942) 51 Yale L. J. 1093.
Tex. Stat. (Vernon, L936) art. 6036 a.
"Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 8 (b).
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of hearing, but it does not allow the Commission to revoke any
orders or regulations or amend them without a hearing. It reads,
"No rule, regulation, order, or amendment thereof, shall be made
by the Commission without a hearing . . ." This provision adequately provides for the requirement of opportunity to be heard,
not only where a substantive right is involved, but also where one
may be involved.
TYPES OF HEARINGS

The Railroad Commission properly recognizes that adjudication is different from rule making and calls for a different procedure. Adjudication is the determination of controversies between parties, one of whom may be the Commission. Rule-making
is a distinctive function which consists in formulating regulations
having general application, not limited to named parties.
The procedure pattern for adjudication is that of taking
evidence subject to cross-examination; a rule-making hearing may
properly be nothing more than a mass meeting at which speeches
are made and motions or resolutions are adopted by parliamentary
methods. The most important difference is that in an adjudication,
findings must be based upon evidence in a formal record, so that
full rights of rebuttal, explanation, and cross-examination are provided, whereas in a rule-making proceeding the tribunal may
properly regard the record of the hearing as only supplementing
information which the tribunal secures elsewhere.1 6
Probably no one within the Commission has specifically adverted to the need for distinctive hearing procedures for adjudication and for rule-making. It is therefore interesting and significant that the Commission, by and large, has intuitively felt the
need for different types of proceedings for the performance of the
different functions, the result being the evolution of two types of
proceedings, often called "statewide hearings" and "special hearings".
STATEWIDE HEARINGS

For adoption of general rules and regulations, field rules,
and monthly proration schedules, so-called statewide or general
hearings are customarily held. They are usually attended by several hundred. They are decidedly not like trials but more like
mass meetings or conventions. They serve as a forum at which
any problems of general interest to the oil industry may be considered.
Although some statewide hearings are called for business
other than proration, most statewide hearings are regular monthly
meetings, in which all matters of general interest may be considered, but which are devoted primarily to the adoption of proration
schedules.
"Fuchs, Procedure In Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52 Harvard Law
Review 259.
'0Sometimes denominated quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.
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A mere description of the prominent characteristics of the
statewide hearings should be enough to show that they are not
trials. The purpose is not to make a decision on the record of the
evidence. Statewide hearings are public meetings at which all
points of view may be freely expressed, in order that the Commission's policies and rules may be guided in part by the desires of
those affected. Speeches made at the meetings are not and ought
not to be considered as evidence. Rules and policies adopted are
not and cannot be supported by substantial evidence, because evidence has to do with questions of fact, and usually the questions
dealt with at the statewide hearings are questions, not of fact,
but of judgment or discretion.
The nature of statewide hearings is too much misunderstood.
Lawyers here and there who are accustomed to courtroom proceedings seem to think that the forms of the courtroom should be
carried into the statewide hearings.
Rightly understood, the system of statewide hearings is an
outstanding achievement in government. It is fair and efficient.
The proration task is an especially formidable one. The Commission must fix the state allowable, divide the allowable among the
various fields, and fix the allowable of each well in the various
fields. Yet the Commission has succeeded in developing a procedure
whereby every interest not only has full opportunity to be heard,
but is even positively encouraged to examine and criticize the
Commission's materials and methods.
The system proves that government by bureaucracy can still
be government with the consent of the governed, that is, regulation with the approval and assistance of the regulated.
Since the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not
provide for proration, the problem of statewide hearings is not
involved. The statute provides that the Commission shall prescribe rules and regulations governing the practice and procedure
before, it.17 The Commission could, if the necessity arose, carry
on hearings equally as efficient and democratic as the statewide
hearings in Texas.
NOTICE OF HEARINGS

The Texas statute provides that no rule, regulation, or order
shall be adopted except after hearing upon at least ten (10) days
notice given in the manner and form prescribed by the Commission.18
The chief reliance in letting the public know of statewide
hearings is upon the daily press and trade journals, which are
wholly adequate for that purpose. It is generally known that the
regular proration hearing is held between the 15th and 20th of
each month, and extraordinary statewide hearings are always
featured in the trade news.
" Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 8 (a).
"Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6036 a.
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Notice of proposals for changes in field rules or in the rules
for an area are sent to all operators in the field or area. If a proposal concerns a single well or wells on a single lease, notice is
sent to all adjoining operators or to all owners or operators for
a considerable distance. Doubts about what parties are entitled
to notice are resolved in favor of giving notice. Announcements
of special hearings are also frequently published as news items.
The Colorado statute assures that adequate notice shall be
given, that is, sufficient notice of the subject matter involved to
enable the party to formulate a defense.
The statute provides that there shall be at least ten (10)
days notice and that notice shall be given either by publication
or by personal ser- ice, and in addition, notice by publication must
be made in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in
which the land is affected. If the Commission decides to give notice
by personal service, the service may be made in the same manner
as that provided for in civil actions in the District Courts of this
state. The notice shall issue in the name of the state, shall be
signed by the Commission, shall specify the time and the place,
and briefly state the purpose of the hearing. In cases of violations
of rules, regulations or orders, notice must be served on the interested parties in the same manner as is provided in the rules of
civil procedure for the service of process in civil actions in the
District Court of this state. 19
Any person desiring notification of hearings can file with
the Secretary his name and address and the areas he is interested
20
in, and receive notice of all hearings relative to his interests.
PARTIES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
Anyone who cares to do so may participate in the statewide
hearing, even though no interest is shown. Participation in special
hearings is limited to interested parties, although no definition
of this term is given.
Parties are usually represented by attorneys in important
hearings. Some lawyers make a specialty of practice before the
Commission. Attorneys employed by the major companies spend
a large part of their time before the Commission and its examiners. The Commission and its staff express no preference for
representation of parties by attorneys; on the contrary, those
with training or experience in engineering or operating are often
favored.
Since the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission is
not concerned with proration, the problem of who is an interested
party in a statewide hearing is not involved.
11Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. (c) and (d).
20The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules
and Regulations, Rule 517.
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The Commission does state, in its rules of practice and procedure, certain situations in which a party will be considered an
interested party. 21
The Commission has no preference as to who should represent
parties before it. Heretofore, those appearing before the Commission have been exclusively represented by lawyers. The Commission is not interested in who appears as council, so long as the
elements of fair play are complied with.
EXAMINERS
Although the three commissioners usually conduct statewide
hearings, it is very seldom that one commissioner is present at a
special hearing. Occasionally requests are made for rehearing before the Railroad Commission itself, and such requests are usually
granted.
The usual presiding officers in a special hearing are two examiners of the staff of the Oil and Gas Division. These two examiners
usually hear the cases together. One, a lawyer, presides and questions witnesses. The other, an engineer, asks some questions and
later assists in the preparation of the examiner's report.
In few cases do examiners make any pre-hearing study or
other preparation, and even then, the amount of effort expended
in advance of the hearing is usually slight. The initiative is usually
supplied by the applicant.
Hearings are quite informal, usually more nearly resembling
round table conferences than trials. Examiners grant or deny
motions or informal requests for postponements or continuances,
entertain objections of procedural points, pass upon admission of
evidence, and otherwise manage the hearing process. The examiners assume the affirmative responsibility of building a complete
and clear record, often asking questions for the sole purpose of
getting answers in the record.
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission does not
make use of trial examiners. The need has not yet arisen.
Three members of the Commission constitute a quorum for
the transaction of business, and for the holding of hearings. '
At the hearing before the Commission, an attorney for the
Commission, and an engineer of the Commission are always present.
There is really no need for the Commission to have their experts present, since each commissioner is either a lawyer or an
engineer with years of experience.
Most of the witnesses who testify before the Commission are
experts. To save time and operate more efficiently the Commission
assumes that they qualify as experts unless challenged by one of
the parties. To avoid voluminous records, to save money and time,
" The Oil and Gas
and Regulations, Rule
" The Oil and Gas
and Regulations, Rule

Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules
515.
Conservation Commission of the. State of Colorado, Rules
520.
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the Commission usually has each expert briefly but concisely state
his position, and the conclusion he has reached. The Commission
recently saved much valuable time by use of this method.
Hearings before the Commission are conducted without rigid
formality.2 3 Emphasis is placed on a fair and speedy hearing.
SUBPOENAS AND PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT

In Texas, subpoena provisions are of little practical importance, because needed information is almost always either supplied
voluntarily at hearings, or contained in the reports required by
the Commission, or 2secured
by the Commission's almost unlimited
4
power of inspection.
The statutory power of the Railroad Commission to "punish
for contempt or disobedience of its orders as the district court
may do" arrests attention. 25 This is contrary to the concept of
separation of powers. Only a judicial officer may commit for
contempt. The general practice throughout the country has been
to provide that administrative agencies may apply to a court for
an order requiring a reluctant witness to testify, disobedience
then being contempt of court.
Although the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not
give such sweeping powers as does the Texas statute, it does not
provide the Commission with the power to require the making and
filing of reports and
the inspection by the Commission of the
26
producer's records.
The Act also provides the Commission with the power to summon witnesses and require production of records. Any district
court within the state can compel the witness to attend a hearing
and produce his records. The district court shall have the power
to punish
for contempt, for failure to comply with the court's
27
order.
As in Texas the provision for subpoena is of little practical
importance since the Commission has in its files almost every
record upon which an issue would be raised.
RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Railroad Commission and its examiners neither apply
or purport to apply the rules of evidence. Any information anyone
wants to offer at a hearing will be admitted, the only limitations
being considerations for relevancy or usefulness and the needless
cluttering of the record. Letting everything in for what it is
worth may have its disadvantages, for records are unduly lengthened and unreliable information may occasionally influence a
decision.
'

Ibid, Rule 519.

Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6008.
2 Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6024 and 6025.
-' Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 11.
2

-

Ibid. Sec. 9 (a) and (b).
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The Conservation Commission of Colorado conducts its hearings without rigid formality. In general, the rules of evidence
applicable before a trial court without a jury shall be applicable,
providing that such rules may be relaxed, where, by so doing, the
ends of justice will be better served.
Any person testifying in support of or in opposition to a
rule, petition, or complaint, or motion shall be required to do so
under oath or affirmation. Full opportunity shall be afforded all
interested parties at
a hearing to present evidence and to cross28
examine witnesses.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS

Attorneys before the Railroad Commission usually file briefs.
Briefs are considered part of this record. Oral arguments are
made before examiners. A good deal of the testimony is argument.
Little attempt is made to limit argument to facts and to reserve a
time when argument as such may be presented. Arguments, at
whatever stage of the hearings they may be made, form a part of
the record unless they are expressly made off the record.
Usually, there is no oral argument made before the commissioners unless the Commission grants special permission for oral
argument. All hearings before the Colorado Conservation Commission are conducted before at least three commissioners, and
oral argument is permitted. The filing of briefs is encouraged.
TRANSCRIPTS

Most of the records taken before the Railroad Commission
are taken in shorthand, and never transcribed. Records are available to any parties who are willing to pay the cost of transcribing
them. Whenever the record is not transcribed, the memories and
the notes of the staff members who have attended the hearing
afford the basis for decision.
Proceedings before the Colorado Conservation Commission are
transcribed and made a permanent record. The records are placed
in the Commission's files and are made a matter of public record.
OFFICIAL NOTICE
Just as a court takes judicial notice of what is common knowledge and of general information bearing on questions of law and
policy, so the Commissions take official notice of what to them and
their staffs is common knowledge. One of the purposes of the
administrative process is to gain the advantages of special knowledge and this special knowledge or expertness should be utilized
to the full.
The crucial problem concerning official notice is the extent to
which the Commissions can resort to their files to secure specific
information which is not part of the record of the particular
.'The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules
and Reg-ulations, Rules 519 and 521.

DICTA

Mar., 1954

adjudication. In quasi-legislative proceedings, the Commissions
can usually seek information from all sources whatsoever, without
limitations. But in quasi-judicial proceedings there should be an
opportunity for each party to meet and rebut the evidence, and
test it with cross-examination.
The Railroad Commission, in the past, has failed to recognize
the distinction between the two types of hearings and considers
all previous records incorporated in the record before it. In
quasi-judicial proceedings, failure to incorporate the past records
by specific reference, may be a denial of procedural due process
of law because the parties may not have a chance to rebut the
secret evidence used against them.
The Supreme Court of Texas, in the past, has refused to
enforce the requirements of procedural due process and has en2
couraged the Commission in using extra record information. "
That court has held: "It would be placing a useless and intolerable
burden on the Commission to require it to make an appeal proof
record in every instance." Is it useless to give an opposing party
a chance to meet evidence which influences a tribunal to make
an adverse decision? What the Texas court must have had in
mind is that the procedural protection should be afforded at the
judicial stage of a proceeding rather than at the administrative
stage.
One of two alternatives must be chosen to meet the due process demands of the Federal Constitution. There must be either
a hearing before the Commission which will assure opportunity
to meet all opposing evidence on disputed questions of fact, or
there must be a completely de novo judicial hearing.
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951 provides
that anybody adversely affected by any rule, regulation, or order
may bring an action against the Commission or the State Oil
Inspector or both.30 The trial shall consider all the evidenceshall hold a trial de novo-. 3 1
A District Court of Colorado has said, "While it is true that
the proceedings in review must be conducted as a trial de novo,
the issue at the trial de novo is whether or not the orders of the
Commission complained of are valid . . . All the court can say here
is that the orders complained of are valid and should be enforced,
or that they are not valid and should not be enforced . . . The test
to be used by this court is whether or not the evidence before the
court will sustain the orders of the Commission . . .2
It is submitted that if the Commission found disputed facts
from extra record material and the district court found that the
Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 139 Tex. 80, 161 S.W. (2d) 1035 (1942).
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 10 (a).
3, Ibid. Sec.
10 (c).
'2 Sharples Oil Corp., Union Pacific R.R. Co., Texas Co., v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Phillips Petroleum Co., California
Co., Stanolind Oil and Gas Co.
2Cook
'o
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evidence would sustain the order of the Commission, there would
be a denial of due process.
Under this system, the aggrieved party never does get a fair
hearing on the merits of his case. He is given no such hearing
before the Commission because he has no chance to rebut the
secret evidence used against him. He gets no hearing on the merits
in the district court, because the court does not decide on the
merits but limits itself to the question of whether or not the evidence before the court will sustain the orders of the Commission.
It should be noted that it is permissible for the Commission
to go beyond the record to get undisputed facts. If this were not
so, it would unduly limit the appropriate scope of official notice.
But it would be a denial of due process for the Commission to find
disputed facts from extra record sources.
EXAMINERS REPORTS

The responsibility for preparing the examiner's report is
primarily that of the examiner who has presided at the hearing,
but the report is by no means that of one individual. At least two
examiners usually collaborate on the report and sign it, but others
who may or may not have been present at the hearing often participate. Recommendations on engineering problems are considered to be those of the engineering department, not those of any
individual.
Intermediate reports should be submitted to the parties. Letting the parties know what materials have come to the attention
of those who make the final decision is of considerable consequence
in satisfying the parties that they have had a fair hearing. One
of the ingredients of many of the Commission's decisions is the
expert judgment of an officer who has not attended the hearing,
and unless an intermediate report is served on the parties, they
may be permanently deprived of opportunity to meet the materials
which become decisive.
The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission does not use trial
examiners. We are therefore not concerned with examiners' reports to the commissioners.
DECISION MAKING

One day each week, the Railroad Commission holds a conference to make decisions. The Director of Production usually attends, as well as the examiners who heard the case. The group
considers each file as well as the examiners' report, pertinent
exhibits, and sometimes record information.
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission meets
after each hearing to make their decision. The Commission goes
over the evidence and briefs if any have been filed. The commissioners do not have to go over a trial examiner's report because
no trial examiner is used. The findings and order of the Commission must be unanimous.
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CONFERENCES BETWEEN COMMISSIONERS AND PARTIES

It is the general practice of the commissioners to consult
with the parties affected both before and after a hearing. Effective regulation with the consent and cooperation of the regulated,
demands that the commissioners should maintain contacts with
those affected. The life of the legislative process lies largely in
informal pressures, and that is as true when an administrative
agency is exercising the legislative function as it is when the legislature itself is doing so.
But the Commission should designate which proceedings are
in the nature of adjudications and that with respect to those proceedings would take great care to refrain from consulting with any
party about the particular case in the absence of opposing parties.
The objective should be to permit, even encourage, informal consultation with parties concerning the Commission's legislative
activities, but at the same time to protect against extra-record
influences when the Commission is performing a judicial function.
To permit a party to an adjudication to talk ex parte to the man
who decides, is to violate the elementary requirements of procedural
fairness.
FINDINGS

The findings of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission are in writing and are a matter of public record. The
findings of the Commission must be based on findings of fact.3
There is a strong tendency on the part of state courts, and an
almost universal practice in the Federal Courts, to require that
an order or decision of an agency be accompanied with a statement
by the agency of the mental processes of the agency by which the
evidence was weighed and added up to a finding of ultimate fact.
This requirement is not predicated on any constitutional ground,
but seems rather to be deemed a matter of administrative morality
34
by the Courts.
Whether the Conservation Commission would be required to
give the reasoning behind their findings, in the light of the trial
de novo provision in the conservation act, is questionable.
CONCLUSIONS

(1)

Colorado's non-political Conservation Commission can probably operate more fairly and efficiently than can the political
Railroad Commission of Texas.
(2) The term "order" as used in the statute should be construed,
for the sake of efficiency, to exclude reports and engineering
tests.
(3) The provision in the Texas statute for amendment and cancellation of rules and orders without a hearing may be a
denial of due process.
"Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules and
Regulations, Sec. 8 (b).
I Hurst, Administrative Law Outline, Spring Quarter, 1950.
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(4) The "statewide" hearing seems to be a very democratic means
for the purpose it serves.
(5) The provision for notice in the Colorado Conservation Act
more than meets every element of notice and adequacy thereof.
(6) The requirement of the Conservation Act that a transcript
of the hearing and the findings of the Commission be made a
matter of public record, makes it easier to determine if the
Commission has used outside evidence on which they based
their findings.
(7) The issues at the trial de novo should not be whether the evidence will support the order of the Commission, but, (1) was
there waste? (thus eliminating the problem of denial of due
process by the Commission's use of secret evidence) and, (2)
Is the Commission's order reasonable?
(8) The requirement that the commissioners must preside at the
hearing more adequately satisfies one that he will get a fair
hearing, and assures that the one who hears will be the one
that decides.
(9) Either the Commission should include more of their reasoning
in their findings or the trial de novo provision of the statute
should be rewritten.

SUPREME COURT WARNS LAWYERS
In Fraka v. Malernee decided by the Colorado Supreme Court
on February 15, 1954, Justice 0. Otto Moore used the following
language which should be carefully noted by every member of
the Bar.
The foregoing facts point out the necessity for this
court to command the attention of members of the bar,
and to sound a warning that failure of a lawyer to observe and comply with our Rules of Civil Procedure may
result in disaster to the cause of his client.
Because the writ of error in the instant cause must
be dismissed, and for the reason that there seems to be a
growing tendency among members of the bar to believe
that briefs can be filed whenever it is convenient, and that
the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to proceedings before
this court can be ignored or violated without serious consequences, we feel compelled to say that failure to follow
the established -rules of appellate practice may be fatal to
a cause. Our court intends to enforce the Rules of Civil
Procedure, and we solicit the co-operation of members of
the bar, with the firm belief that they will approve an
orderly procedure in appellate practice which can only
be brought about by the observance of the rules which
must govern that practice.
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A LAWYER'S
ADVICE TO THE UNMARRIED MOTHER
PIERPONT FULLER*

As every older lawyer knows and as every fledgling practitioner will soon find out, there is one problem, not considered in
the law school curriculum and not included in the index of Corpus
Juris Secundum, which finds its way into the attorney's office with
some frequency and in unexpected ways. This is the problem presented by an illegitimate pregnancy. A young unmarried girl may
be "in trouble" or a married woman may be going to have a baby
not her husband's. You may be consulted by distraught parents,
by the frightened mother-to-be or by the worried father. The
problems presented may be legal problems only in the broadest
sense, and the lawyer if he is not careful may find himself acting
as a sort of amateur marriage counsellor, family consultant, psychiatrist, minister and social worker rolled into one.
Whatever the ramifications of the problem, and they can be
infinite in their variety, it is always a tremendously serious one
to the person or people involved. The whole course of their future
lives may depend on the advice the attorney gives at the first interview.
The simple and offhand solution in such cases is for the parties
to get married immediately, but, ordinarily, if there had not been
good reasons why that could not be done, the lawyer would never
have heard of the matter in the first place. The man may not want
to get mairried and it is perfectly clear that he cannot be forced
against his will to marry the girl, even if that might seem a good
idea. Sometimes real legal questions may present themselves; a
divorce for one of the parties may be in order; a bastardly suit
may be necessary to require the father to support the child, (C.S.A.
1935, Ch. 20) or a prosecution for nonsupport may have to be
instituted (C.S.A. 1935, Ch. 83 Sec. et seq.). But these are really
side issues to the main problem, and usually any legal proceeding
or anything which might lead to any publicity is the last thing
in the world the parties want. Under these circumstances, what is
the lawyer's duty to his client and to society?
The first thing to remember is that having a baby is a perfectly natural phenomenon. It happens frequently and the only
unusual feature in this case is that certain man-made rules superimposed upon the natural process by custom and statute have been
disregarded. Experience has shown that these man-made rules are
disregarded with some degree of frequency too, with the result
that in all communities of any size now days, facilities have been
set up to take care of just such situations.
* Of the Denver Bar and President of the Board of Control of the Colorado
State Children's Home.
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The next thing to remember is that these facilities which
consist of various private and public organizations and agencies
go about their business with no fanfare or publicity whatever. The
girl about to have a baby out of wedlock is facing a very serious
upheaval in her life. She is usually feeling pretty panicky and
often has come to, or is about to go to a strange city where she
knows no one so that she may keep her "disgrace" a secret from
her friends and probably from her family as well. If she is made
to appreciate these two propositions, her psychological problems
will be somewhat alleviated. The lawyer in this kind of picture,
if he gets into it at all, is not there to act as a spiritual advisor
or to pass judgment on qustions of morals but to find a practical
solution to an unfortunate situation. Having found such a solution he will be very smart to step out of the picture and go back
to practicing law. He may be called in again to enforce support
payments or advise regarding legal questions which he is trained
and equipped to handle, but usually not.
The best advice the lawyer can give, then, is to refer the girl
to one of these agencies which are equipped by knowledge, training, and experience to handle all phases of her problem.
The first thing the agency will do will be to quiet the girl's
fears of publicity, danger and disgrace. It will arrange for proper
medical care, and arrange for her to enter a responsible maternity
home if that is the best plan. The girl will have many questions,
some half formed and unspoken. An experienced woman will
counsel with her as often as necessary to answer all questions.
She may be undecided as to whether to keep or give up the child.
How can she support the baby if she keeps it? What will happen
to the baby if she relinquishes it? All of these matters will be explained her her. The agency will also confer with the father if
he is available, and will make arrangements for the payment of
anticipated medical expenses in any event.
If the child is to be relinquished, the effect of that act will
be fully explained to the mother. She must understand that a
final order of relinquishment entered by the County or Juvenile
Court is actually and in all respects final and divests the relinquishing parent of all legal rights and obligations she has in respect
to her child. Similarly, it releases the child from all legal obligations to the parents. It is the same as any other final judgment
and cannot be set aside except as permitted by Rule 60 of the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides that any
motion to set aside a judgment even on the grounds of "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, fraud . . . misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party" must be made
within a reasonable time and in any event not more than six months
after the judgment was entered.
In 1949 a law was passed with the avowed objective of eliminating and making impossible any "black market in babies." (See
Ch. 33 Sec. 43 (1) et seq., 1935 C.S.A.). It defines "relinquishment"
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as the act of releasing a child to the Colorado State Children's
Home, any county Department of Public Welfare, or to a licensed
child placement agency. It makes the reliquishment or receiving
of a child for the purpose of adoption except in the manner set
forth in this statute a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. The effect of this law is that a mother cannot legally
relinquish her child except through the County or Juvenile Court
unless it be to the step-parent. grandparent, uncle or aunt of the
child. Another effect is that the Court's order of relinquishment
will ordinarily award custody of the child to a public or licensed
private child placement agency. That is always the case in Denver
and some other Counties, but Section 43(6) of the Act as interpreted by an Attorney General's opinion permits the Court to
award custody to "whomsoever the Court shall see fit," and under
this authority some County Judges undertake to do their own investigating of the health and background of the baby and adoptive
parents and place the child for adoption themselves. In any event,
the law requires that the Court must be satisfied that the relinquishing parent has been offered advice designed to apprise such
parent of the consequences of the act of relinquishment "so that
no child shall be hastily deprived of its birthright." This law and
its operation will be fully discussed with the girl and she will
understand why it is vitally essential for the welfare of the child
that all available facts concerning the health, race, physical characteristics and religion of both parents be made available to the
agency which will place the child for adoption. For, with this information, the mother can rest assured that an excellent wellsuited home will be waiting for her child, and that carefully selected
adoptive parents will cherish that baby just as if and probably
more than if it were their own.
These agencies through long experience have found that the
earlier the girl comes to them the more effective will be their help
to her. Early medical attention is very important. Moreover,
the girl will learn of the various resources available to her and
much of her anxiety can be relieved. The longer the agency knows
her the better chance it will have to get acquainted with her and
so will be in a better position to help her plan for herself and the
child. Probably one of the reasons for abandoned infants, accounts of which occasionally appear in the press, is that the
mothers of these babies were bewildered and frightened, unable to
cope with their situation by themselves and had one one to tell
them where they might get help. Such abandoned babies may
have to spend a long period of time in an institution instead of
being placed early in an adoptive home because the necessary background material regarding the parents' health and race is not
available.
So when the problem of an illegitimate pregnancy is presented,
the best thing a lawyer can do is to refer the girl to one of the
social agencies which have been organized to meet the needs of
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girls confronted with just that situation. Fortunately, there are
many such agencies. Some supported by private and some by
public funds. In Colorado the best known are:
Booth Memorial Hospital
1001 Jasmine St., Denver
County Department of Public Welfare,
at the county seat in every County.
Denver Catholic Charities
1665 Grant Street, Denver.
Family and Children's Service of Colorado
314 14th Street, Denver
Family-Service of Colorado Springs
28 East Boulder.
Family Service Society
322 West Fifth, Pueblo.
Florence Crittenton Home
4901 West Colfax Ave., Denver.
Jewish Family and Children's Service
Room 504, 314 14th Street, Denver.
Lutheran Service Society
Room 204C, 314 14th Street, Denver.
Pueblo Catholic Charities
309 Bon Durant Blvd., Pueblo
(This is the first of two articles covering relinquishments and
adoptions. The second on adoptions will appear in an early issue

of DICTA.)

A CLAUSE OF A LAWYER'S WILL
Here is a clause for your own will or codicil:
"I hereby give and bequeath to THE COLORADO BAR
FOUNDATION, Inc., a Colorado not for profit corporation,
the sum of $ ------------------ , to be used by it for its general
purposes."
Your own interest in the activities of the Foundation
will help you to determine the appropriate figure to put in
the blank after the dollar sign.
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ADVICE ON THE STUDY OF LAW-APRIL, 1834
CLELL W. HARDEE*

This letter is one which was written by Chief Justice Story
to Doctor Francis Lieber in 1834 answering a request for advice
on the study and practice of the law. To the best of my knowledge
and belief the transcription is set forth here exactly as it was in
the original letter, which is now in the Lieber collection, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
Cambridge, April 5, 1834
My dear Sir:
In reply to your letter of the 27th inst., I will proceed at once,
before I mention other matters, to that, which must be to you
the primary consideration, the question of your studying lawI will proceed in the order of your points.
(1) How much time would be required ?-I think with your
attainments four hours a day for two years would be amply sufficient to give you all and more than all the knowledge attained by
young gentlemen, when they are admitted to the Bar. But as rules
of admission to the Bar differ in various States-Some require
three years study; (as with us) ; some two years; some one year,
or even a less period. How it is in Penn.-I do not know. In the
western states a short period only is required.
(2) With whom should you study?-It is difficult for me to
give the best advice-but I should think Mr. Sergeant, Mr. Jasper
R. Ingersoll or Mr. Chancey the best leaders, for they are in full
and various practice.
(3) How long would it be before you could maintain yourself in the practice of the law? It is difficult to answer this question in any satisfactory manner. Much depends on your choice of
location, upon accidental chances of business, upon patronage, and
upon the facilities of getting known at the Bar and among the
people. Young lawyers rarely are able to maintain themselves
until they have been at the Bar as long as three years. With your
talents and acquirements I should not doubt, that with a tolerably
favorable location you would be able to do so in that period. In
the west, at least in Indiana, or Illinois, or Michigan, I should not
doubt Ohio is not unfavorable. But I should think Kentucky would
be unfavorable not for a literary man, but for a stranger-lawyer.
The jurisprudence of that state is peculiar and artificial, and difficult to be mastered.
(4) Would I advise you to go to the West after studying law?
I doubt not, that you could earlier or more surely command success there, than in an old country, where business is already settled
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
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down into known hands and habits. But Pennsylvania has some
advantages for a German, as many of the inhabitants speak the
language. And Philadelphia, is a highly literary city, which would
give much collateral employment to an active and ardent mind, in
writing and translating, or in writings until a well ( . . .) and
reputation shall bring law business-If you were educated in the
Common Law and its practices, you could confer invaluable services upon American jurisprudence by tranLlating, abridging, and
illustrating foreign law and the Civil Law, so as to-bring each of
them within our reach. But I should hope, that you might obtain
(at all events), some academial professorship in a literary city,
which would aid any other objects which you might indulge in.I am free to say, most think few men so well qualified, as yourself,
for such a station. If Howard University should (by and by),
establish a Professorship of History, I should not be without hope,
that it might be offered to you. We should not have any objection
to your foreign birth and education. I do not know that Mr. Starks
would desire such an office. I rather think he would prefer a free
literary life-but, of course, I do not know his wishes: and, if he
should desire it, his claims would probably be preferred to those
of all other persons.
For myself, I can only say, that I dare not recommend to you
any particular study strongly, because I am sure, that you can
best judge for yourself upon a survey of the whole ground. But
I have a very strong belief that you could scarcely fail of success
in anything which you should undertake. My confidence in your
talents has never been disappointed; and it seems to me, that with
your industry and attainments you cannot long be without adequate support. If I were to choose for you, I should choose a Professorship, or a devotion to literature as an Author, in the study
of the law, for practice and for composition. In studying the law
I do not think you can do better than to follow out our course of
instruction at Cambridge, of which I suppose you have a program.
I have sent by William Gray two copies of the Conflicts of
Laws, one for yourself, and the other for Professor Mittenmaler.
Please to advise him of it when you next write. Apraise him also
of my great gratification in his opinion of my work on Constitutional Law. I shall complete the law article for him as soon as
possible, and send it to you. Probably with that I shall write him
a letter to your home. I hope the time is coming, when all lovers
of the law, on the Continents of Europe and in America, will be
brought closely together for mutual improvements. I shall press
Mr. Sumner to learn German. I deeply regret that I do not know
it; and if I could command time I would buckle on my armour and
yet contend for the prize. I am most truly your obedient friend
Doctor Lieber.
JOSEPH D. STORY.
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DIVORCE: COUNTY OF RESIDENCE A MATTER OF
JURISDICTION-Petitioner in People v. District Court ' was the
defendant in an action for divorce brought in Rio Grande County,
Colorado. In that action after defendant filed her answer and
a cross-complaint, the plaintiff withdrew his complaint, and
an interlocutory decree was entered in favor of the defendant.
No testimony whatsoever was introduced as to the residence of
either party in Rio Grande County. Nevertheless, the trial court
in granting the interlocutory decree entered its findings that both
parties were residents of Rio Grande County, Colorado.
The defendant later filed a motion to set aside her interlocutory decree. This motion was granted and the pleadings were reinstated to the same state and condition that existed prior to the
entering of the interlocutory decree.
The defendant then filed her verified motion for a change of
venue on two grounds:
1. That neither party had ever been residents of Rio Grande
County, Colorado, and that the action was therefore in
violation of Section 6, Chap. 56, '35 C.S.A. which provides
that, "Such suit shall only be brought in the county in
which such plaintiff or defendant resides, or where such
defendant last resided."
2. That it would be more convenient for witnesses.
Upon the trial court's denial of this motion, the defendant
filed her petition for a writ in the nature of prohibition.
The Supreme Court held that the question of whether change
of venue for the convenience of witnesses should be granted was
a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and that there
was no abuse of discretion disclosed.
In considering the petitioner's argument that a change of
venue should be granted because the action was not commenced
in the proper county as provided by the statute, the Supreme
Court held that, while the action had been commenced in the wrong
county, this was ijo ground for a change of venue. It was held
that the statutory provision was one of jurisdiction and not of
venue. In effect the Supreme Court said that where the residential
requirements are not met the court has no jurisdiction whatsoever,
and the court must dismiss the case. "When bona fide residence
in said Rio Grande County was not established, the court was under
a mandatory duty to refuse to hear or grant any motions whatever
in the action, and its dismissal must follow."
This case is merely a reaffirmation of the construction of the
statute as laid down in the case of Branch v. Branch,- where the
258 P 2d 493 CBA Adv. Sh. No. 22, 1952-53.
--.---Colo -......-30 Colo. 499, 71 P. 632.
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Supreme Court said that,
Causes can only be brought in the county where the
plaintiff resides, or where the defendant resides, or where
the defendant last resided. It is a jurisdictional question,
and can not be waived by the parties. Unless the residence required by statute is in some manner shown, the
court is without jurisdiction.
It goes without saying that the obvious result of these two
cases is that probably many divorces, granted throughout the state
and relied on by the parties involved, are not valid unless it was
shown in some manner that the residential requirements necessary
to give the court jurisdiction had been met.
Statutory provisions similar to that of Colorado's with regard to which county an action for divorce may be brought are
found in many states. Most of these states interpret their residential requirements as being jurisdictional, though various reasons
are suggested for so holding." In Colorado in a 1902 case brought
under our Civil Code, 327 (which provided that, "All civil actions,
with certain exceptions, shall be tried in the county in which the
defendant may reside at the commencement of the action, or in
the county where the plaintiff resides when service is made on the
defendant in such county, . . ."), our Supreme Court stated that
in divorce cases, "Whatever reason might be advanced for this
limitation (i.e. the mandatory venue requirements) is wholly immaterial for independent of these considerations, the legislature
undoubtedly had the power to change the usual rule in civil actions, and provide that only certain forums determined by the
residence of the parties should take jurisdiction of divorce proceedings by their commencement. 4 The Colorado court's opinion
was largely based on statements by the California Supreme Court
5
in the case of Warner v. Warner,
interpreting the California
divorce venue statute which, while worded differently from our
own, is equally mandatory on the subject.
However, construction of divorce venue statutes throughout
the states is not uniform. An example of a statute similar to Colorado's holding that a provision as to the county in which the action
must be brought was a requirement of venue and could be waived
rather than a requirement of jurisdiction which could not be
waived is Missouri's. See the case of Osmak v. American Car and
Foundry Co.,' In that case the Supreme Court held that the restriction was merely for the benefit of the parties involved and
could therefore be waived by their mutual consent. The states that
'May v. May, 94 Pa. Super. 293. Hetherington v. Hetherington, 200 Ind. 56,
160 N.E. 345. In Re Goldberg's Estate, 288 II. App. 203, 5 N.E. 2nd 863 Holt v.
Holt, 253 Mass. 411, 149 N.E. 40.
'The People v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123, 69 P. 597.
100 Cal. 11, 34 P. 523.
'329 Mo. 159, 40 S.AV. 2nd 714.
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hold as Missouri that the venue requirements in divorce actions7
are not mandatory and may be waived seem to be in the minority.
ELAINE S. BERNICK.

EVIDENCE: RADAR EVIDENCE OF VEHICLE'S SPEED
-As there is some evidence that Colorado may install a radar
system to help police and patrol our highways, the following cases
may be of interest to the members of th - Bar. In State v. Moffitt.'
the Delaware Superior Court held that where an expert has testified to the accuracy of the "Radar Speed Meter," that a test conducted by a policeman not skilled in electronics was competent
evidence and sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant
guilty of driving at an excessive rate of speed.
In People v. Off erman,2 the New York Supreme Court of Erie
County held that evidence of a test conducted by a non-expert witness (policeman) without the testimony of an expert was incompetent and, therefore, not sufficient to justify a conviction of driving at an excessive rate of speed. The court in reversing and remanding the case for a new trial stated that:
The legislature in its wisdom might see fit to declare
that the reading of an electrical timing device similar to
the one here may be admitted in evidence as prima facie
evidence of the speed of the automobile of an accused,
after such device has been certified as accurate by the
authority designated by the legislature. By such legislation, the People will be relieved of the burden of proving
the accuracy of the electrical timing device upon each
trial and by expert testimony. The traveling public will
be protected against convictions based upon the reading
of an unproven and possibly inaccurate device, and of
equal 3 importance, the rules of evidence will not be violated.
In the absence.of legislation, it will be necessary for an expert
in the field of electronics and radar to testify to the accuracy of
the device, in each individual case, before any evidence of a test
will be admissible into evidence.
JOHN S. PFEIFFER.

Hammons v. Hammons, 228 Ala. 264, 153 So. 210; Davis v. Davis, 179 N.C.
185, 102 S.E. 270.
1 100 A. 2d 778, Sept. 23, 1953.
Y. S. 2d 179, Oct. 21, 1953.
- 125 N.
: Ihid, p. 185.
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BOOK.TRADER'S CORNER
Attorney Dan Lorenz of Steamboat Springs has a set of
American Jurisprudence, a set of Hillyers Annotated Forms of
Pleading and Practice and some miscellaneous text books and form
books for sale. Anyone interested should contact Mr. Lorenz.
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